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This book is not quite what I was expecting. I admit that 
my main reason for wanting to read it—and perhaps, in hind-
sight, not an especially good reason—was the intriguing pair-
ing of terms found in the title. Was I wrong to have expected 
Philosophy & Animal Life to contain philosophical arguments 
about animals? My simplistic assumptions about its contents 
were challenged from the get go, as I found that this volume 
is actually a series of dialogical essays on the general theme of 
what our lived experiences—and, indeed, the experiences of 
fictional literary characters—can teach us, as humans, about the 
reality and meaning of animal. In keeping with the length and 
tone of the book, I will keep this review short.
A source much discussed by each author represented here 
is J. M. Coetzee’s novel The Lives of Animals, with special at-
tention paid to Coetzee’s character Elizabeth Costello, a novel-
ist giving a series of lectures at a college. Costello is severely 
troubled by the ways humans routinely treat other animals; 
however, she seems unable to adequately convey her sense of 
this troubling through language, and especially through con-
ventional philosophical argumentation. Diamond takes Costel-
lo to exemplify a “difficulty of reality” that cannot be captured 
by the practices of philosophical discourse, which is thought 
to deflect (rather than, I suppose, facilitate the absorption of) 
this reality. What we have here is what philosophers might call 
a problem: Philosophy appears for many, in virtue of its very 
methodology, to be failing not only at the task of enabling a full 
understanding of an important aspect of human existence—of 
helping us stay “turned … towards the life of the animals we 
are,” as Diamond puts it (77)—but also both at the realization 
of its purported potential as an avenue for apprehending what 
our current mode of existence means for other kinds of sentient 
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beings, and as a guide to the ways in which we might respond 
to such a realization.  
One possible, partial remedy for this is to take a more liter-
ary or poetic approach to conveying these difficulties. Perhaps 
a different style of communication, one that elicits more feel-
ings, will do the trick, or at least help us do it. This approach is 
suggested, for me, by both the writing styles and stated views 
of some of the authors of Philosophy & Animal Life (namely, 
Wolfe, Diamond, and Cavell). Hacking, interestingly, suggests 
that the human ability to deflect reality may not be such a bad 
thing (for us, it might be replied). If we have evolved the ability 
to insulate or shield ourselves from some potentially painful re-
alities by translating them into the language of philosophy, why 
not avail ourselves of this ability? My preferred answer, ironi-
cally, could have philosophical origins: Because this practice 
may not always lead us as near to truth about existence as we 
would hope to get. While Philosophy & Animal Life is not quite 
what I expected, I greatly enjoyed this treatment of how attend-
ing to (i.e. not deflecting from) embodiment can help humans 
both cultivate empathy and, perhaps, come to a settlement with 
skepticism about what is “out there.”  
